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Abstract
We study revenue optimization in a repeated auction between a single seller and a single
buyer. Traditionally, the design of repeated auctions requires strong modeling assumptions
about the bidder behavior, such as it being myopic, infinite lookahead, or some specific form of
learning behavior. Is it possible to design mechanisms which are simultaneously optimal against
a multitude of possible buyer behaviors? We answer this question by designing a simple state-
based mechanism that is simultaneously approximately optimal against a k-lookahead buyer for
all k, a buyer who is a no-regret learner, and a buyer who is a policy-regret learner. Against
each type of buyer our mechanism attains a constant fraction of the optimal revenue attainable
against that type of buyer. We complement our positive results with almost tight impossibil-
ity results, showing that the revenue approximation tradeoffs achieved by our mechanism for
different lookahead attitudes are near-optimal.
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1 Introduction
Developing a theory of repeated auctions that outlines the boundaries for what is and is not possible
is of both scientific and commercial significance. On the application side, it is partly motivated
by online sale of display ads in ad exchanges via repeated auctions. An essential difference that
sets apart the repeated/dynamic setting from its one-shot counterpart is the significantly higher
revenue that is achievable in the former. The key reason for this difference is simply that bundling
may increase revenue, and repeated interactions provide ample opportunities to bundle across time.
In its gross form, a dynamic mechanism that bundles across time could simply demand the buyer
to pay her entire surplus for T future rounds, save some small ǫ, upfront for the promise of getting
the item for free in all future rounds. A risk-neutral buyer would have no choice but to accept this
offer to get expected utility of ǫ or else get 0 utility. Such mechanisms that threaten buyers to get
either tiny or 0 utility have several drawbacks, the most prominent being that they force the buyer
to make a huge payment upfront which is unappealing. This motivated a string of recent work
Ashlagi et al. [2016], Mirrokni et al. [2016a], Balseiro et al. [2017], Mirrokni et al. [2017] proposing
mechanisms that satisfy per round ex-post individual rationality, i.e. that the buyer’s utility is
non-negative in every round under his optimal strategy, rather than interim individual rationality
(IIR), which only requires that the buyer’s long-term expected utility is non-negative.
Nevertheless, the ability of these dynamic mechanisms to extract high revenue depends crucially
on several non-trivial assumptions:
1. The buyer completely understands the seller’s mechanism. In particular, he understands, and
can optimally respond to the consequences of his actions today on his utility k rounds later,
for all k;
2. The buyer believes that the interaction with the seller will last for all future rounds;
3. The buyer believes that the seller will stick to her proposed mechanism for all future rounds.
In particular, the notion of ‘infinite look-ahead buyers’ which is baked into the widely used con-
cept of dynamic incentive-compatibility, requires that the buyer’s action in every round takes into
account the consequences of his action on his utility in all future rounds, thus relying on all of the
above assumptions. There are important practical reasons invalidating these assumptions. Firstly,
the buyer may not be fully informed about and/or trust all the details of the seller’s mechanism.
Furthermore, cognitive/computational limitations or uncertainty about the future may prevent
buyers from being infinite lookahead. In the context of online advertising, for example, given the
number and variety of display ad exchanges in the market, with credibility levels all across the
spectrum, the buyers often don’t trust that the seller will faithfully implement the announced
mechanism Kantor [2016].
As a result, the seller often faces a buyer population that employs a variety of strategies, beyond
perfectly rational infinite lookahead utility maximization, in order to maximize their perceived
utility. Such a buyer could
1. be myopic or more generally, have a limited lookahead, i.e., evaluate his decisions today only
based on their effect on the utility of k future rounds (a k-lookahead buyer).
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2. be a learner, i.e., completely disregard the seller’s description of the mechanism, and instead
make his decisions through his favorite learning algorithm using only his observed feedback
so far.
In face of such heterogeneous behaviors, the revenue-optimal solution for the seller is to have a
tailored mechanism for each buyer behavior. However, there are strong reasons precluding the im-
plementation of different mechanisms, each targeting a specific buyer behavior. Such discriminative
targeting may be legally infeasible, and it may also be practically infeasible, as it could be hard
for the seller to identify a buyer’s response behavior. The latter may not even be well-defined, as
buyers may change their response strategy across time. These observations motivates us to we ask
the following question.
Can we design mechanisms which are robust against heterogeneous buyer behaviors?
Specifically, we seek a single mechanism that gets approximately optimal revenue simultaneously
against buyers with different lookahead and learning behaviors, i.e., against each type of buyer,
obtains a constant fraction of the optimal revenue achievable by mechanisms tailored to that specific
type of buyer.
Our setting and main results. We study a repeated interaction between a single seller and
a single buyer over multiple rounds. At the beginning of each round t = 1, 2, . . . , T , there is a
single fresh good for sale whose private value vt ∈ V for the buyer is drawn from a publicly known
distribution1 F with finite expectation µ. The buyer observes the valuation vt and makes a bid bt.
The good for sale in round t has to be either allocated to the buyer or discarded immediately (i.e.,
not carried forward). The buyer’s valuations are additive across rounds.
Our goal is to investigate the sensitivity of revenue extraction to variations in both the ‘looka-
head attitude’ and the ‘learning behavior’ of the buyer. To this end, we introduce a novel framework
for characterizing revenue tradeoffs of dynamic mechanisms under heterogeneous buyer behavior.
We formalize variations in forward-planning attitude (or lack thereof) of the buyer by considering
a range of lookahead levels: from myopic to limited k ≥ 1 lookahead to infinite lookahead. We
model learning behavior of the buyer using the popular concept of no-regret learning, and allow
different levels of learning sophistication by considering buyers who minimize simple regret vs.
policy regret. Formal definitions of these different buyer behavior are provided in Section 2. We
characterize a mechanism as robust if it simultaneously achieves near-optimal revenue for different
buyer behaviors.
Definition 1 We call a mechanism (α, β)-robust against lookahead attitudes if, for any per-
round valuation distribution F , it simultaneously achieves an expected average (over T rounds)
revenue of at least
• α ·RevMye − o(1) against any myopic buyer, and
• β · µ− o(1) against any k-lookahead buyer with k ≥ 1,
where RevMye = maxx x(1− F (x)), µ = Ex∼F [x], and o(1) are functions that go to 0 with T .
1As we explain later, for our positive results, the seller only needs to know the mean µ and not the whole
distribution F .
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Definition 2 We call a mechanism (α, β)-robust against learning behaviors if, for any per-
round valuation distribution F , it simultaneously achieves an expected average (over T rounds)
revenue of at least
• α ·RevMye − o(1) against any no-simple-regret learner, and
• β · µ− o(1) against any no-policy-regret learner,
where Myerson revenue RevMye and mean µ are defined as in the previous definition, and o(1) are
functions that go to 0 with T .
Our main contribution is a simple mechanism that can be tuned robust against different looka-
head attitudes, as well as different learning behaviors. Our base mechanism will additionally satisfy
interim individual rationality (IIR) and non-payment forcefulness, as defined in Section 2.4. We
will subsequently modify our base mechanism to improve its individual rationality properties.
Theorem 1.1 For any ǫ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a non-payment forceful and IIR mechanism that is
( ǫ2 , 1− ǫ)-robust against lookahead attitudes.
Theorem 1.2 For any ǫ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a non-payment forceful and IIR mechanism that is
( ǫ1+ǫ , 1− ǫ)-robust against learning behaviors.
Note that our robust mechanism navigates a tradeoff between revenue achieved for different types
of buyers, i.e., a tradeoff between α and β. Upfront, it is not obvious if α must be decreased
to increase β. We prove an impossibility result showing that any dynamic mechanism must face
such a tradeoff. Further, our impossibility result provides a quantitative limitation on the revenue
tradeoff achievable, demonstrating that our mechanism achieves the best tradeoff possible within
a constant factor.
Theorem 1.3 There exists a regular and decreasing hazard rate distribution F such that, for all
ǫ ∈ [0, 1] and δ > 1− ǫ2 , there is no mechanism that is non-payment forceful and (ǫ, δ)-robust against
lookahead attitudes.
The proofs of Theorems 1.1–1.2 are provided in Section 4 and Appendix B, while the proof of
Theorem 1.3 is provided solely in Appendix B.
Injecting Ex-Post Individual Rationality The base mechanism provided thus far is robust
with respect to different buyer behaviors, but only satisfies Interim Individual Rationality. Is it
possible to strengthen this mechanism to also satisfy the stringent notion of per-round ex-post
Individual Rationality, discussed earlier in the introduction and defined formally in Section 2.4? As
it turns out, per-round ex-post IR is too strong a requirement when it comes to extracting revenue
that is close to full surplus from forward-looking buyers with limited lookahead. Specifically, we
show that there exist valuation distributions for which the revenue achieved by any per round
ex-post IR mechanism is exponentially smaller compared to full surplus for finite lookahead buyers.
Theorem 1.4 There exists a valuation distribution F such that any non-payment forceful and
per-round ex-post IR mechanism can achieve expected average (over rounds) revenue of at most
log(kµ) + 1 from a k-lookahead buyer with any finite k ≥ 1.
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In view of this limitation for finite lookahead buyers, we turn our attention to myopic buyers
and infinite lookahead buyers, providing a modification to our base mechanism that guarantees
per-round ex-post IR for these types of buyers. To be precise, for infinite lookahead buyers our
mechanism guarantees per-round ex-post IR with high probability, i.e., there exists a strategy for
the buyer that with high probability is both optimal and satisfies the per-round ex-post IR condi-
tions. We provide the modification to our mechanism and establish its properties in Appendix A,
establishing the following:
Theorem 1.5 For any ǫ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a non-payment forceful and IIR mechanism that is
( ǫ2 , 1 − ǫ)-robust against lookahead attitudes, ex-post IR against a myopic buyer, and with a high
probability ex-post IR against an infinite lookahead buyer.
The per-round ex-post IR property, even if only guaranteed with high probability for infinite looka-
head buyers, is a strong requirement that successfully eliminates advanced selling or threat-based
mechanisms. For example, let us consider the advanced selling mechanism that in every round asks
the buyer to pre-pay for tomorrow’s good a price equal to its expected value, for the guarantee that
this good will be allocated tomorrow. This mechanism gets expected average per round revenue
equal to the mean of the distribution, but it violates high probability ex-post IR, since a forward-
looking buyer will choose to pre-pay for tomorrow’s good in every round. This results in realized
utility of v − µ, which may be negative with constant probability.
2 Our framework
In this section, we present the main components of our framework, including a state-based mecha-
nism design setting, formal models for buyers’ heterogeneous lookahead and learning behaviors, and
a revenue optimization objective to calibrate the mechanisms against different behaviors.
2.1 Setup
We study a repeated interaction between a single seller and a single buyer for a finite number of
rounds T . At the beginning of each round t = 1, 2, . . . , T , there is a single fresh good for sale whose
private value vt ∈ V for the buyer is drawn from a publicly known distribution F with expectation
µ. The buyer observes his value vt at the beginning of the round and makes a bid bt. The good for
sale in round t has to be either allocated to the buyer or discarded immediately (i.e., not carried
forward). The buyer’s valuations are additive across rounds.
Round outcome. The outcome of the game in round t is a pair (xt, pt), where xt ∈ {0, 1}
indicates whether or not the buyer received the good and pt ∈ R is the payment made by the buyer
to the seller. For the outcome pair (xt, pt) in round t, the linear utility ut of the buyer in round t
is given by ut(bt) = vtxt − pt, and the seller’s revenue is given by pt.
Dynamic state-based mechanism. We consider dynamic mechanisms, where the allocation
and payment (xt, pt), in a round t, may depend on the current state st, in addition to the bid bt
made by the buyer. Such a dynamic mechanism M is defined as a 5-tuple M = (S, Q, x, p, s1),
where
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1. S is the state space over which the mechanism operates. The state space S can be finite
dimensional or countably infinite dimensional. The cardinality of S can be finite, countably
infinite or uncountably infinite.
2. x : S×R+ →∆{0,1} is the (randomized) allocation function, which at the beginning of round
t receives as input the state st ∈ S in round t, the bid bt ∈ R+ made by the bidder in round
t, and outputs the allocation xt ∈ {0, 1} for the bidder in round t, where xt ∼ x(st, bt).
3. p : S × R+ × {0, 1} → R is the payment function, which at the beginning of round t takes as
input the state st ∈ S in round t, the bid bt ∈ R+ made by the bidder in round t, and the
allocation xt sampled as above, and outputs the payment pt for the bidder in round t, i.e.,
pt = p(st, bt, xt).
4. Q : S ×R+×{0, 1} ×R→∆S is a state-transition function that takes as input at the end of
round t the state st ∈ S, the bid bt ∈ R+ of the bidder in round t, the allocation xt ∈ {0, 1}
and the payment pt ∈ R, and outputs the distribution of next state st+1 for round t+ 1, i.e.,
st+1 ∼ Q(st, bt, xt, pt). 2
5. s1 ∈ S is the starting state.
Bidding strategy. We consider multiple types of buyer behaviors, namely, different lookahead
attitudes and learning behaviors. Therefore, the buyer’s ‘optimal’ bidding strategy is not necessarily
the one that maximizes linear utility ut(b) = vtxt − pt in round t. Instead the choice of bids {bt}
is determined by the behavioral setting, and we refer to them as ‘behaviorally optimal’ choice of
bids.
2.2 Lookahead behaviors
ℓ-lookahead utility. We will define lookahead attitudes of buyers using the concept of ℓ-lookahead
utility, i.e., the total utility over the current and next ℓ rounds. Assuming there are at least ℓ re-
maining rounds following round t, the buyer evaluates a bid b in round t by computing its expected
utility over the current round plus the maximum expected utility obtainable over the next ℓ rounds.
More precisely, at round t, given the current state st and valuation vt, for any ℓ, the buyer’s expected
ℓ-lookahead utility for bid b, assuming T ≥ t+ ℓ, is defined as:
U tℓ (st, vt, b) := E[ut(b) + sup
bt+1,...,bt+ℓ
ℓ∑
j=1
ut+j(bt+j)] (1)
= E
[
vt xt(b)− pt(b) + sup
b′
U t+1ℓ−1 (st+1, vt+1, b
′)
∣∣∣∣st, vt
]
, (2)
U t0(st, vt, b) := E
[
vt xt(b)− pt(b)
∣∣∣∣st, vt
]
, (3)
where xt(b) ∼ x(st, b), pt(b) = p(st, b, xt(b)), st+1 ∼ Q(st, b, xt(b), pt(b)). And, the expectation was
taken over the random values vt+1 ∼ F and any randomization in the mechanism.
2Given that our price function is a deterministic function of st, bt, xt we could have also suppressed pt from the
arguments of Q.
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Buyer lookahead behaviors. We define the following types of buyers with different lookahead
attitudes:
• k-lookahead buyer: A k-lookahead buyer is a buyer who, in every round t, picks his bid bt to
maximize min{k, T − t}-lookahead utility, i.e., a behaviorally-optimal bid for such a buyer in
round t is given by
bt ∈ arg max
b∈R+
U tmin{k,T−t}(st, vt, b) (4)
We refer to the bid bt computed above as a k-lookahead optimal bid (Note that in general,
the maximizer in the above equation may not exist, see the technical remark below). Two
special cases of k-lookahead buyers are:
– Myopic buyer: We refer to a 0-lookahead buyer as a myopic buyer.
– Infinite-lookahead buyer: If a mechanism lasts for T rounds, we refer to a k-lookahead
buyer with k = T − 1 as an infinite-lookahead buyer.
• Forward-looking buyer: A forward looking buyer maximizes kt-lookahead utility for some kt ∈
{1, . . . , T − t}, at every time t. Thus, a forward-looking buyer may use different lookaheads
at different time steps, but always looks ahead at least one step.
We say that a buyer is using a behaviorally-optimal policy if the buyer’s bid bt satisfies (4) for
k = kt at all time steps t.
Technical Remark. To be completely formal, the definition of k-lookahead buyer given above
requires that the maximizer in (4) exists. There are mechanisms in which this maximizer does not
exist. For instance, consider a single-state mechanism that offers the item at a price of ǫ, whenever
the bid is 1− ǫ < 1, and does not offer the item when the bid is 1. This mechanism has no optimal
k-lookahead bid for any k. Such mechanisms are undesirable as they make it difficult for the buyers
to decide what bid to use, and therefore for the sellers to understand what revenue to expect, even
if they know their buyer’s lookahead attitude. For this reason, the mechanisms that we construct
are such that there always exists an optimal k-lookahead bid.
2.3 Learning behaviors
Background on no-regret learning. To formally model a broad class of buyer learning behav-
iors, we use the concept of no-regret learning, a widely studied solution concept in the context of
T round online prediction problem with advice from N experts. In this problem, at every round
t = 1, . . . , T , an adversary picks reward gt = {g1,t, . . . , gN,t} where gi,t is the reward associated
with expert i. The learner needs to pick an expert it ∈ [N ] to obtain reward git,t. Regret in time
T is defined as
Regret(T ) = max
i∈[N ]
T∑
t=1
gi,t −
T∑
t=1
git,t. (5)
A no-regret online learning algorithm for this problem uses the past observations gi1,1, . . . , git−1,t−1
to make the decision it in every round t such that Regret(T ) ≤ o(T ). When the number of experts
N is finite, there are efficient and natural algorithms (e.g., EXP3 algorithm based on multiplicative
weight updates) that achieve O(
√
NT logN) regret.
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Note that ’regret’ compares the total reward achieved by the learner to the reward of best single
expert in hindsight. Furthermore, even if the adversary is adaptive (i.e., generates gt adaptively
based on i1, . . . , it), in this simple-regret framework, the performance of the best expert is evaluated
over the sequence of inputs g1, . . . ,gT produced by the adversary in response to the learner’s
decision, and not those that would be produced if this expert was used in all rounds. This is an
important distinction between the above definition of regret, for which efficient online learning
algorithms like EXP3 are known, vs. the more sophisticated ‘policy regret’ which we define next.
Background on policy regret learning. A no-policy-regret learning algorithm is a more so-
phisticated learner based on the definition of policy regret from Arora et al. [2012]. Such an algo-
rithm faces an adaptive adversary, and achieves o(T ) policy regret, defined as:
Policy-regret(T ) = max
j1,...,jT∈CT
T∑
t=1
gjt,t(j1, . . . , jt)−
T∑
t=1
git,t(i1, . . . , it). (6)
where C(T ) is some benchmark class of deterministic sequences of experts of length T , and the gjt,t
and git,t have been explicitly written as a function of past decisions to indicate adaptive adversarial
response to the sequence of choices so far. A special case is where C(T ) is the class of single expert
sequences, so that
Policy-regret(T ) = max
i
T∑
t=1
gi,t(i, . . . , i)−
T∑
t=1
git,t(i1, . . . , it). (7)
Our characterization of buyer learning behaviors. We consider a buyer who only gets to
observe whether the current state is good (st ∈ ⊥) or bad (st /∈ ⊥), and the valuation vt, before
making the bid, and the outcome (allocation, price) after making the bid, but does not know (or
does not trust) anything else about the seller’s mechanism. Using these observations, the buyer is
trying to decide bids bt, using a learning algorithm under the experts learning framework described
above. We formalize the notion of different levels of learning sophistication among buyers by
considering two classes of learners:
• No-regret learner: Such a buyer considers, as experts, a finite collection E of mappings from
the state information (st = ⊥ or st 6= ⊥) and valuation vt to a bid, i.e., set of experts
E = {f : [⊥, 6⊥]× V¯ → V¯ }; (8)
where V¯ is an discretized (to arbitrary accuracy) version of V , in order to obtain a finite
set of experts. The buyer uses a no-regret learning algorithm to decide which expert ft ∈ E
to use in round t to set bt = ft(st, vt). The adversarial reward at time t is given by the
buyer’s tth-round utility, determined by the seller’s mechanism’s output, i.e., on making bid
bt = ft(st, vt) in round t, the reward is given by buyer’s utility
ut(bt) := E[vtxt − pt|st, vt, bt]
For a no-regret learning buyer (refer to (5)),a behaviorally-optimal policy is any bidding strat-
egy such that for the trajectories of bids, states and valuations s1, v1, b1, . . . , sT , vT , bT , gen-
erated by this policy, we have in hindsight,
Regret(T ) = max
f∈E
T∑
t=1
ut(f(st, vt))−
T∑
t=1
ut(bt) = o(T ) (9)
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Here, we slightly abused the notation to define f as a function of st, vt, where as technically
it is only a function of f(1(st = ⊥), vt), that is, it only uses whether st = ⊥ or st 6= ⊥.
• No-policy-regret learner: This more sophisticated buyer uses a no-policy-regret learning algo-
rithm. Following (7), the important distinction from the definition of regret in the previous
paragraph is that now the total utility of best expert must be evaluated over the trajectory
of states achieved by the expert. To make explicit the dependence of tth round utility on past
decisions through the state at time t, let us denote the utility in round t as u(bt, st) Then,
following (7), policy-regret of such a buyer is given by:
Policy-Regret(T ) = max
f∈E
T∑
t=1
ut(f(s
′
t, vt), s
′
t)−
T∑
t=1
ut(bt, st), (10)
where s′1, . . . , s
′
T is the (possibly randomized) trajectory of states that would be observed on
using the expert to decide the bids in all rounds. For a no-policy-regret learning buyer, a
behaviorally optimal policy is any bidding strategy such that for resulting trajectory of bids
and states s1, b1, . . . , sT bT , the above quantity is guaranteed to be o(T ).
While constructing such a no-policy-regret learner is difficult in general, for our proposed
stochastic state-based mechanisms and the above special case of single expert sequences, this
is achievable by some simple learning strategies. In fact, a simple buyer learning strategy that
will work for our mechanism to achieve no-policy-regret with high probability, is to explore
each possible bid for some time and then use the best single bid for the rest of the time steps.
2.4 Desirable properties of a mechanism
Non-payment forceful. A mechanism is non-payment forceful if the payment pt is always non-
negative, and 0 when the bid is 0, i.e.,
p(st, bt, xt) ≥ 0, and p(st, 0, xt) = 0, for any st, bt, xt. (11)
Such a mechanism has the desirable property that it cannot be forced to pay the buyer in any state
and it cannot force payments out of buyers who bid 0.
Interim Individually Rational (IIR) A mechanism is defined to be interim individually ra-
tional (IIR) iff at any time t, given any history and current valuation vt, there exists a bid bt such
that the buyer’s expected perceived utility is non-negative. For a k-lookahead buyer, this means
that given any state st, valuation vt, for any bid bt that is k-lookahead optimal at time t, we have
U tmin{k,T−t}(st, vt, bt) ≥ 0.
Note that since the buyer’s utility is a non-negative aggregate (possibly over multiple future time
steps) of per time-step buyer utility, the non-payment-forceful condition guarantees IIR.
An interim-individually rational mechanism allows take-it-or-leave-it offer based mechanisms
like the following: “pay E[v] today to get the item tomorrow.” A forward-looking buyer would find
this offer attractive, hence the seller would extract the full surplus, E[v]. An unsettling feature of
the afore-described mechanism is that, for some realizations of v, the buyer ends up with negative
utility. In particular, while this mechanism is interim Individually Rational (IR), it is not ‘ex-post
IR’.
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Ex-post IR This requires that the total utility of a rational buyer at the end of T rounds
is non-negative in hindsight. That is, there exists some behaviorally optimal policy, such that
all trajectories of bids bt, t = 1, . . . , T (and implicitly the trajectories of states and valuations
s1, . . . , sT , v1, . . . , vT ) generated by this policy satisfy
∑T
t=1 ut(bt) ≥ 0.
Here, ut(bt) = Ext∼x(st,bt)[xt · vt− pt(st, bt, xt)|vt, st, bt] is the round t utility defined in the previous
section as the buyer’s value from that round’s allocation minus the payment.
Per-round Ex-post IR We also consider a stronger version of ex-post IR considered in some
previous works Ashlagi et al. [2016], Mirrokni et al. [2016b] : at each round, the utility of the
buyer, defined to be his value from that period’s allocation minus the buyer’s payment, must be
non-negative. More precisely, we define a mechanism to be per round ex-post individually rational
if there exists some behaviorally optimal policy such that every trajectory of bids b1, . . . , bT (and
implicitly states s1, . . . , sT and valuations v1, . . . , vT ) generated by this policy satisfies
∀t, ut(bt) ≥ 0. (12)
Per-round ex-post IR is a stronger requirement than ex-post IR, and clearly implies ex-post IR. It
is also referred to as stage-wise ex-post IR Mirrokni et al. [2016b].
3 Our Mechanism
We prove our positive results by proposing a simple state-based mechanismM(ǫ, ρ, p) parameterized
by three parameters p (threshold price), ǫ, and ρ. A high level description of the mechanism is
as follows. The mechanism uses roughly the average of buyer’s past accepted bids to decide the
buyer’s state. The mechanism can be in two types of states: ‘good state’ if the current average
is above (1 − ǫ)µ, and ‘bad state’ otherwise. In a good state, the mechanism always accepts the
buyer’s bid (irrespective of the bid value), with payment equal to bid. The state transitions from
a ‘good state’ to a ‘bad state’ if the average of accepted bids falls below (1− ǫ)µ. In a bad state, if
the buyer’s bid is above the threshold p, then with probability ρ, the bid is accepted and the buyer
is transferred to a good state. Any bid below p is rejected in a bad state.
Below are the precise definitions.
Definition 3 (Mechanism M(ǫ, ρ, p)) • State Space S: The state space is S = R×N. We
represent a state s ∈ S by pair (b, n) ∈ R × N, where b¯ represents an average of n past bids.
We refer to states s = (b, n) with
b ≥ (1− ǫ)µ
as ‘good states’, and all the other states as ‘bad states’. Abusing notation a little, if s is a
bad state we say s = ⊥, otherwise, we say s 6= ⊥. Further, we refer to any state of form
st = ((1− ǫ)µ, 0) as a ‘borderline’ good state.
• Starting state s1: The mechanism starts in a borderline good state, i.e.,
s1 = ((1− ǫ)µ, 0).
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• Allocation rule x(st, bt): Given current state st, and bid bt, this mechanism always allocates
in a good state. In a bad state, it allocates with probability ρ if the bid bt is above the price p.
That is, xt ∼ x(st, bt), where
x(st, bt) =


1, if st 6= ⊥,
Bernoulli(ρ), if st = ⊥ and bt ≥ p,
0, otherwise.
• Payment rule p(st, bt, xt): This is a first price mechanism, i.e.,
p(st, bt, xt) =
{
bt, if xt = 1,
0, otherwise.
Note that the payment is always smaller than bid, with 0 payment no allocation. By definition,
this mechanism is non-payment forceful in all states.
• State-transition function Q(st, bt, xt, pt): Q(st, bt, xt, pt) provides the distribution of next
state st+1. Let st = (b, n). In this mechanism, the state effectively remains the same if xt = 0.
Otherwise, it transitions either (from good state) to a state with updated average bid, or (from
bad state) to a borderline state.
st+1 =


(b, n), if xt = 0(
bn+bt
n+1 , n+ 1
)
, if st 6= ⊥, xt = 1
((1− ǫ)µ, 0), if st = ⊥, xt = 1,
4 Revenue tradeoffs
In this section, we prove revenue guarantees for mechanism M(ǫ, ρ, p) against buyers with different
lookahead attitudes and learning behaviors. Specifically, we demonstrate that with appropriate
parameter settings, this mechanism achieves the results stated in Theorem 1.1 and Theorem 1.2.
In below, p∗ := argmaxp p(1 − F (p)) and RevMye := p∗(1 − F (p∗)) denote the Myerson price
and Myerson optimal revenue respectively. And, RevM(ǫ,ρ,p) denotes the expected value of average
revenue of mechanism M(ǫ, ρ, p) over T rounds, i.e., RevM(ǫ,ρ,p) := 1T
∑T
t=1 pt. Order notation o(1)
and o(T ) will be used denote asymptotic order with respect to T .
4.1 Revenue against diverse lookahead attitudes
Theorem 1.1 can be obtained as a corollary of the following proposition by substituting ρ = ǫ2−ǫ .
Proposition 4.1 The mechanism M(ǫ, ρ, p) with parameters p = p∗, ρ ≤ ǫ2−ǫ achieves
(a) revenue RevM(ǫ,ρ,p) ≥ ρρ+1RevMye − o(1) against myopic buyers, while achieving
(b) revenue RevM(ǫ,ρ,p) ≥ (1− ǫ)µ− o(1) against k-lookahead buyers for any k ≥ 1.
Proof Sketch: Here, we provide a proof sketch. A detailed proof is provided in Appendix B.
(a) Revenue against myopic buyers. Let us first consider the seller’s expected revenue from a
myopic buyer over T rounds. By definition, the mechanism starts in the borderline good state
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s0 = ((1 − ǫ)µ, 0) 6= ⊥. Since a myopic buyer is only concerned with immediate utility, she will
bid 0 in this state to get allocation with maximum possible utility. However, this will take the
average of bids below the boundary of (1 − ǫ)µ and the bidder will immediately go to the bad
state. In a bad state, such a buyer will bid p∗ whenever vt ≥ p∗. Therefore, the buyer will return
back to the borderline good state s0 with probability ρPr(vt ≥ p∗) = ρ(1 − F (p∗)). Again, in s0,
the myopic bidder will bid 0 and immediately transfer back to a bad state. Therefore, the buyer
will roughly spend ℓ = 1ρ(1−F (p∗)) time steps in bad state for every visit to a good state. The
expected number of such good state-bad state visit cycles is roughly T/(ℓ+1), with seller’s revenue
of p∗ (from bad states) in every cycle. This givens the expected revenue in T rounds as roughly
Tp∗
ℓ+1 ≥ ρρ+1p∗(1 − F (p∗)) = αRevMye. An extra − 1T = −o(1) term is obtained due to possible
interruption of the last cycle.
(b) Revenue against k-lookahead buyers. For k-lookahead buyers for any k ≥ 1, the key is to
demonstrate that in mechanism M(ǫ, ρ, p) with ρ < ǫ2 , an optimal k-lookahead bid in a good state
guarantees that the next state is also a good state. This is proven in Lemma 4.2. The bound on
revenue can then be obtained by observing that starting in a good state, a k-lookahead buyer will
remain continuously in good states. And, since the bidder always gets charged her bid in a good
state, this implies the seller’s average revenue is b¯T which by definition of good states is at least
µ(1− ǫ). Here b¯T denotes the average of bids b1, . . . , bT .
The following lemma forms the key to main technical results in this paper.
Lemma 4.2 Assume ρ ≤ ǫ2−ǫ . Then, at any time t, given that st 6= ⊥, and bt is a k-lookahead
optimal bid, we have that st+1 6= ⊥.
Proof Sketch: To develop an intuition, let us first consider a simpler version of our mechanism
where at every step in the bad state, there is an independent probability ρ of getting an allocation
and transferring back to the good state, irrespective of the bid. (Note that this mechanism, that
does not charge anything in bad states, will result in 0 seller’s revenue against myopic buyers).
Assume that current state st is a good state. Suppose for contradiction that b is an optimal
bid at time t such that st+1 = ⊥. Let us compare the k-lookahead utility of this bid to a bid
b′ ≤ (1 − ǫ)µ that keeps the bidder in a good state st+1 (note that such a bid always exists). The
comparison for 1-lookahead buyer is relatively simple. In both cases, such a buyer will plan to bid
0 in the next round (since next round is the last round in 1-lookahead buyer’s planning horizon).
When st+1 6= ⊥, xt+1 = 1, and therefore, 1-lookahead utility for b′ is at least
vt − (1− ǫ)µt + E[vt+1] = vt + ǫµ.
In comparison, when st+1 = ⊥, the probability of allocation is ρ, and therefore 1-lookahead utility
for b is at most
vt + ρE[vt+1] = vt + ρµ.
Therefore, if ρ < ǫ, b′ is clearly a better choice than the optimal bid b, thus giving a contradiction.
For k-lookahead buyers, extending this argument involves coupling the k-length trajectories of two
bidding strategies: one that plays optimal bids starting from bid b in st vs. a strategy that starts
from bid b′ in state st. By coupling these two trajectories, we aim to compare the k-lookahead
utilities of the two bids, in order to demonstrate that playing b in the state st is strictly suboptimal.
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The coupling point of the two trajectories is the (random) time step t + τ + 1 where the
(supposedly) optimal strategy’s trajectory (that started with b) comes back to a (borderline) good
state for the first time. Define the second bidding strategy in a coupled manner to play bid
b′ = (1− ǫ)µ repeatedly until t+ τ , and optimal bids thereafter. Then, at step t+ τ +1, the second
trajectory is also in a good state, but possibly not borderline. To relate the utilities of the two
trajectories after this coupling point, we use induction along with an observation that the optimal
utility for a trajectory starting at any good state is at least as good as the utility for a trajectory
starting at a borderline good state (refer to Claim 1 in appendix). Therefore, from point t+ τ + 1
onwards, the second trajectory has better, or at least as good utility, as the first supposedly optimal
strategy. It remains to compare the utilities in steps t, t+ 1, . . . , t+ τ .
By definition of τ , under first supposedly optimal strategy, the states at time steps t+1, . . . , t+τ
are all bad states. Therefore, the total expected utility is at most
vt + τρµ
On the other hand, the second strategy of bidding (1− ǫ)µ always stays in good state to get total
expected utility of at least vt − (1 − ǫ)µ + τǫµ in these steps. A better bound for the second case
can be observed by considering the probability that the ‘last’ (i.e., kth) round occurs at the end of
this interval, that is, τ = k. At the last round, the second strategy bids 0 to obtain full valuation
as utility. Therefore, a better lower bound for expected utility is
vt − (1− ǫ)µ+ (τ − 1)ǫµ+ Pr(τ = k)µ
Here Pr(τ = k) = (1 − ρ)k−1ρ. Comparing this with the utility of the first strategy, after some
careful algebraic manipulations we obtain that under condition ρ ≤ ǫ/(2− ǫ), the utility for second
strategy is better than optimal; this gives a contradiction.
Now, lets consider the more complicated allocation rule actually used by M(ǫ, ρ, p) in bad
state: the allocation in bad state actually depends on the bid, and the bidder gets an allocation
with probability ρ only if the bid is above p. Although this makes the payoff for bidder in bad
states worse, and provides more incentive to remain in good state; it also makes analysis trickier
since now the event of a bidder transferring from bad state to good state depends on her bid (and
therefore her valuation) in addition to the random ρ probability event.
Finally, all the coupling arguments and expected revenue analysis sketched above need to be
carried out carefully using martingale analysis and stopping times. The details are provided in
Appendix B.
4.2 Revenue against buyer learning behaviors
Theorem 1.2 can be obtained as a corollary of the following proposition, by substituting ρ = ǫ−o(1).
Proposition 4.3 The mechanism M(ǫ, ρ, p) with ρ < ǫ and p = p∗ achieves a revenue of at least
(a) RevM(ǫ,ρ,p) ≥ ρρ+1RevMye − o(1) against any buyer who is a no-regret learner for the class E
of experts (refer to Equation (8) and (9)), and
(b) RevM(ǫ,ρ,p) ≥ (1− ǫ)µ− o(1) against any buyer who is a policy regret learner for a class C of
sequences containing all sequences of single experts (refer to Equation (10)).
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Proof:
(a) No-regret learners. Consider a bidding function f(st, vt) defined as f(st, vt) = p
∗ when
st = ⊥ and vt ≥ p∗, and 0 otherwise. This is (arbitrarily close to) one of the experts in the class E
of experts that the buyer is using. In the mechanism M(ǫ, ρ, p), with probability ρ, the bid p∗ made
in a bad state will get accepted, to earn utility ut(f(st, vt)) = ρ(vt − p∗) for the buyer. Therefore,
using the above expert as benchmark, we obtain that for any sequence of states and valuations, the
first term in the regret definition (9) is at least
∑T
t=1 ut(f(st, vt)) ≥ ρ
∑
t:st=⊥,vt≥p∗
(vt − p∗) +
∑
t:st 6=⊥
vt
Since the buyer is using a no-regret learning algorithm, she must be achieving a utility that is within
o(T ) of the above utility. Now, the maximum utility achievable in any good state is vt. And, the
buyer cannot make any positive utility in a bad state at time t if vt ≤ p∗. Therefore, a no-regret
learning buyer cannot afford to lose more than o(T ) of the bad state auctions with vt > p
∗. This
means that any no-regret learning buyer must bid bt ≥ p∗ in all but possibly o(T ) of the rounds t
with st = ⊥, vt ≥ p∗. Let B be a random variable denoting the number of bad states in the state
trajectory, and let B′ denote the number of those bad states with vt ≥ p∗, bt ≥ p∗, then,
E[B′] ≥ E[B](1− F (p∗))− o(T )
Also, let G be the number of good states.
To lower bound E[B], let us first consider state trajectories of form
6⊥ ⊥⊥⊥⊥⊥ 6⊥ ⊥⊥⊥ 6⊥ ⊥⊥ . . .,
i.e., lone good states interspersed with sequences of bad states. Then, due to the construction of
the mechanism M(ǫ, ρ, p), the only way the buyer can obtain G− 1 good states (all except the first
good state), only by winning G − 1 bad state auctions. And, since the bad state auctions can be
won only with probability ρ, we have that E[G] ≤ E[B]ρ+ 1. This gives,
E[B] ≥ 1ρ+1 (T − 1),
Combining the above observations,
E[B′] ≥ E[B](1− F (p∗))− o(T ) ≥ 1ρ+1 (1− F (p∗))(T − 1)− o(T ).
Therefore, the total expected seller’s revenue is at least
ρp∗E[B′] ≥ ρ
ρ+ 1
p∗(1− F (p∗))(T − 1)− o(T ) = ρ
ρ+ 1
RevMyeT − o(T )
Now, consider sequences of states with more than one consecutive good states, e.g.,
6⊥ ⊥⊥⊥⊥ 6⊥6⊥6⊥ ⊥⊥⊥⊥ 6⊥6⊥ . . . etc.
Then, in any sub-sequence of consecutive good states, the bid average over all good states except
the first one (call them trailing states) must be at least (1− ǫ)µ, so that the buyer makes at most
v¯ − (1− ǫ)µ utility on average, where v¯ denotes the average valuation over the trailing states. On
the other hand, the above expert f , which bids 0 in good states, makes an average of v¯ utility in
those trailing states (in hindsight). Further, in the bad states, and in the rest of the (non-trailing)
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good states, f is achieving the best possible utility. Therefore, given the no-regret condition, the
number of trailing states can be at most o(T ) and do not effect the revenue calculations above.
(b)No-policy-regret learners. Here, we use the sequence of constant bids (1−ǫ)µ as a benchmark
expert. This bidding strategy ensures that the mechanism is always in a good state st = ((1−ǫ)µ, t),
and achieves a utility of ǫµ. Therefore, since the class C contains such sequences of single experts,
the policy-regret learning buyer must achieve at least ǫµ − o(T ) utility. Now, in bad states, the
buyer can achieve at most ρµ utility on average. Therefore, if ρ < ǫ, then the number of bad states
in buyer’s state trajectory can be at most o(T ). This implies that the trailing good states are
at least T − o(T ). By definition, the bidding average over the trailing good states must be least
(1− ǫ)µ, and therefore, the seller’s revenue is at least (1− ǫ)µT − o(T ).
5 Other related work
There are several streams of literature in dynamic mechanism design. We begin with the stream
that is closest to our work.
Optimal dynamic mechanisms. Papadimitriou et al. [2016] show that the optimal deterministic
dynamic mechanism satisfying ex-post IR constraints even in a single buyer 2 rounds setting, when
the values are correlated is NP-hard. I.e., buyer learns his value of each round when it begins, and
both buyer and seller know the distribution from which these values are drawn. They show that the
optimal deterministic mechanism when the rounds have independent valuations can be computed
in polynomial time. The optimal randomized mechanism even with correlated valuations can be
computed in polynomial time. Mirrokni et al. [2016a] study the single seller single buyer setting
and show that with the IIR constraint, a very simple class of mechanisms called bank-account
mechanisms that maintain a single scalar variable as state already obtain a significantly higher
revenue and welfare compared to the single shot optimal. Ashlagi et al. [2016] and Mirrokni et al.
[2016b] characterize the optimal ex-post IR mechanisms and consider approximations thereof via
simple mechanisms (mainly in the single seller, single buyer setting, but their results also extend
to the multi-bidder case) that again hold a single scalar variable as state. Balseiro et al. [2017],
consider a single seller single buyer setting and show that the seller can earn almost the entire
surplus as revenue, even after imposing per round ex-post IR requirements and martingale utilities
for the buyer. Mirrokni et al. [2017] study oblivious dynamic mechanism design, namely, one where
the seller is not aware of the future distributions of the buyer, and just the distribution for this
round: they show that even with just this information, one can construct an ex-post IR dynamic
incentive compatible mechanism that gets a 15 of the optimal dynamic mechanism that knows all
future distributions.
Mechanism design for buyers with evolving values. Another major focus area in dynamic
mechanism design is one where buyers experience the same or related good repeatedly over time,
and their value for the good evolves with time/usage. Initiated by the work of Baron and Be-
sanko Baron and Besanko [1984] there is a large body of work Besanko [1985], Battaglini [2005],
Courty and Li [2000], Bergemann and Strack [2014], Eso and Szentes [2007] that study optimiza-
tions in the presence of evolving values. Recent works include those by Bergemann and Strack
[2015], Athey and Segal [2013], where they consider general models where value evolution could
depend on the action of the mechanism. Kakade et al. [2013], Pavan et al. [2014] study revenue
optimal dynamic mechanism design where the buyer’s value evolves based on signals that she re-
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ceives each period. Chawla et al. [2016] study martingale value evolution for the buyer and show
that simple constant pricing schemes followed by a free trial earns a constant fraction of the entire
surplus.
Bargaining, durable goods monopolist and Coase conjecture. There is a large body of
literature in economics that studies settings where the value is initially drawn from a distribution,
but in subsequent rounds, the value remains the same, i.e., there is not a fresh draw in every
round. This setting can be motivated based on several applications including bargaining, durable
goods monopoly and behavior based discrimination. See Fudenberg and Villas-Boas [2006] for an
excellent survey and references there in for an overview of this area.
Dynamically arriving and departing agents. Yet another body of work that comes under the
umbrella of dynamic mechanisms is one where agents arrive and depart dynamically. Naturally
focus is quite different from what we do in this paper.
Lookahead Search. The study of k-lookahead search can be viewed in the context of bounded
rationality, as pioneered by Herb Simon Simon [1955]. He argued that, instead of optimizing,
agents may apply a class of heuristics, termed satisfying heuristics in decision making, A natural
choice of such heuristics is restricting the search space of best-response moves. Lookahead search
in decision-making has been motivated and examined in great extent by the artificial intelligence
community Nau [1983], de Kleer and andMark Shirley [1992], Sefer et al. [2009]. Lookahead search
is also related to the sequential thinking framework in game theory Stahl and Wilson [1994]. More
recently, Mirrokni et al. [2012] study the quality of equilibrium outcomes for look-ahead search
strategies for various classes of games. They observe that the quality of resulting equilibria increases
in generalized second-price auctions, and duopoly games, but not in other classes of games. No prior
work studies dynamic mechanisms that are robust against various lookahead search strategies.
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A Mechanism for per-round ex-post IR with infinite lookahead
buyers
As discussed in the introduction, it is not possible to get any reasonable approximation to µ as
revenue against k-lookahead buyers for small k when per-round ex-post IR is imposed. Nevertheless,
we show here how to make small modifications to the mechanism discussed in Section 3 to get per-
round ex-post IR in all but a constant number of rounds for an infinite lookahead buyer (i.e., a
T -lookahead buyer in a T -rounds game).
Let B be the highest value in the support of the buyer value distribution and µ the mean of
the distribution. The target-revenue Rtarget be defined as
Rtarget = Tµ(1− ǫ)−
√
4Bµ
√
T ln(T )−
√
2Bµ ln(T )
T∑
j=1
1√
j
(13)
= Tµ(1− ǫ)− c ·
√
BµT ln(T ) (14)
Definition 4 (Mechanism M∞(ǫ, ρ, p)) 1. State Space S: The state space is S = R×R×N.
A state s = (TP,EP, t) is a good state if TP ≥ EP , and bad otherwise. TP stands for the total
payment made by the buyer in the good state, and EP stands for the payment the mechanism
expects the buyer to have paid and t is the total number of rounds elapsed, including the
current round that’s beginning.
2. Starting state s1: The mechanism starts at t = 0, EP = 0, and TP = µ
√
T+
√
4Bµ
√
T ln(T ).
I.e., the mechanism the buyer a credit of µ
√
T +
√
4Bµ
√
T ln(T ) to begin with.
3. Allocation rule x(st, bt): Given current state st, and bid bt, this mechanism always allocates
in a good state. In a bad state, it allocates with probability ρ if the bid bt is above the price p.
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That is, xt ∼ x(st, bt), where
x(st, bt) =


1, if TP ≥ EP,
Bernoulli(ρ), if TP < EP and bt ≥ p,
0, otherwise.
4. Payment rule p(st, bt, xt): This is a first price mechanism, with a small change:
p(st, bt, xt) =
{
min(bt, Rtarget − TP ) if xt = 1 and TP ≤ Rtarget,
0, otherwise.
5. State-transition function Q(st, bt, xt, pt): Q(st, bt, xt, pt) provides the distribution of next
state st+1. Let st = (TP,EP, t). In this mechanism, the state effectively remains the same if
xt = 0. Otherwise, it transitions to a state with updated total payment and expected payment.
The total payment naturally increases by pt. The expected payment increases not by µ(1− ǫ),
but has an additional slack, namely, it increases by µ(1− ǫ)−
√
2Bµ ln(T )
t .
st+1 =


(TP, 0, t+ 1), if TP ≥ Rtarget
(TP + pt, EP + µ(1− ǫ)−
√
2Bµ ln(T )
t , t+ 1), if Rtarget > TP ≥ EP
(TP,EP, t+ 1), if TP < EP, xt = 0
(TP, TP, t+ 1), if TP < EP, xt = 1,
The main difference between this mechanism M∞(ǫ, ρ, p) and the M(ǫ, ρ, p) defined in Section 3
is that when in the boundary state of TP = EP at the beginning of round t, inM∞ the agent needs
to bid µ(1− ǫ)−
√
2Bµ ln(T )
t to stay in a good state, as opposed to µ(1− ǫ) in M(ǫ, ρ, p). I.e., there
is a slack that vanishes with time, i.e., as t gets large. Thus having to bid even lower than what he
had to in Section 3 to remain in the good state, it immediately follows that Lemma 4.2 holds for
our modified mechanism as well, i.e., any agent in a good state, will continue to be in a good state
as it is less costly. This immediately implies identical revenue guarantees for all lookahead buyers,
with a cµ
√
T loss in revenue due to the vanishing slack this mechanism provides in every round
(and also the slack initially).
Truthful bidding will not lead a bidder out of good state w.h.p. Consider a bidder
bidding his true value Vt in round t. The probability that, for any r, after r rounds of bidding true
value Vt we have TP < EP is at most
1
T c by Chernoff bounds (the slacks are chosen in M∞ to
satisfy this). Therefore, by union bound, the probability that it ever happens in any of T rounds
is at most TT c → 0 as T →∞. I.e., with a high probability, truthful bidding will never lead a buyer
out of good state.
Truthful bidding is optimal w.h.p. Note that the mechanism doesn’t accept payment once
it has earned a revenue of Rtarget. This Rtarget is computed to be the minimum revenue that the
mechanism is guaranteed to extract from a buyer that always lives at the boundary state. Or
equivalently Tµ − Rtarget is the maximum utility such a buyer can earn, and this in turn implies
that this is the maximum utility an infinite lookahead buyer can earn. To achieve this utility, an
infinite lookahead buyer need not shade his bid to constantly live at the boundary state — just
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bidding his true value is an equally good strategy (modulo the tiny probability that this will get
him to a bad state, where he bids whatever is necessary to maintain him in good state) in terms
of utility. Thus, bidding the true value throughout all the T rounds (which is clearly a per-round
ex-post IR strategy) is an optimal strategy with probability 1− 1poly(T ) .
The above discussion gives us the proof of Theorem 1.5, restated below
Theorem 1.5 For any ǫ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a non-payment forceful and IIR mechanism that is
( ǫ2 , 1 − ǫ)-robust against lookahead attitudes, ex-post IR against a myopic buyer, and with a high
probability ex-post IR against an infinite lookahead buyer.
B Missing Proofs
Proof of Proposition 4.1 Here, we provide a detailed proof of Proposition 4.1. Lemma B.1
proves the result for myopic buyers. Next, Lemma B.2 and Lemma B.3 together provide a detailed
proof for Lemma 4.2, to complete the proof of Proposition 4.1.
Lemma B.1 The mechanism M(ǫ, ρ, p) with p = p∗ satisfies the following properties against a
myopic buyer:
(a) An optimal myopic bid exists for all time steps t.
(b) The average per round revenue against a myopic buyer is bounded as:
Rev
M(ǫ,ρ,p∗,R)
0 ≥
ρ
ρ+ 1
Rmye − 1
T
,
where Rmye is the one round Myerson revenue, namely, Rmye = maxp p(1 − F (p)) = p∗(1 −
F (p∗)).
Proof:
Buyer’s optimal myopic bid: Let us first understand a myopic buyer’s bidding strategy under
mechanism M(ǫ, ρ, p∗, R). At any time t, given st, vt, the myopic buyer makes the bid bt that
maximizes 0-lookahead expected utility, given by U t0(st, vt, bt) = E[xtvt − pt|vt, st]. Now, consider
two cases:
(a) st 6= ⊥: in this case, by definition of allocation rule in M(ǫ, ρ, p∗, R), xt = 1, pt = bt, so that
U0t = E[vt − bt], irrespective of the value of bid bt. Therefore, the (unique) utility maximizing
strategy for the buyer is to bid 0, i.e.,
bt = 0 when st 6= ⊥.
(b) st = ⊥: in this case, by definition of allocation rule in M(ǫ, ρ, p∗, R), with probability ρ,
xt = 1, pt = bt if bt ≥ p∗, so that U0t = E[(vt − bt)1(bt ≥ p∗)]. Therefore, the whenever vt ≥ p∗, the
(unique) utility maximizing strategy for the buyer is to bid p∗, otherwise xt = 0 and any bid less
than p∗ (including 0) is optimal, i.e.,
bt = p
∗, xt = 1 when st = ⊥, vt ≥ p∗, and
bt < p
∗, xt = 0 when st = ⊥, vt < p∗
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Seller’s revenue The seller’s expected revenue is E[ 1T
∑T
t=1 pt]. Now, for mechanism M(ǫ, ρ, p
∗, R),
pt = bt whenever xt = 1 and 0 otherwise. For a myopic buyer as described above, E[pt|st 6= ⊥] = 0,
E[pt|st = ⊥] = p∗ Pr(vt ≥ p∗) = p∗(1− F (p∗)). Substituting:
Rev
M(ǫ,ρ,p∗,R)
0 = E[
1
T
T∑
t=1
pt]
=
1
T
T∑
t=1
E[pt|st 6= ⊥] Pr(st 6= ⊥) + E[pt|st = ⊥] Pr(st = ⊥)
= p∗(1− F (p∗)) 1
T
T∑
t=1
Pr(st = ⊥).
Here,
∑T
t=1 Pr(st = ⊥) is the expected number of times bad state is visited in the T time steps.
Now, by definition, mechanism M(ǫ, ρ, p∗, R) starts in good state s0 = ((1− ǫ)µ, 0) 6= ⊥. A myopic
buyer will bid 0 in this state which will get accepted (see the above discussion in optimal myopic
bid), and she will immediately go to the bad state ((1− ǫ) µn+1 , 0) = ⊥. Transfer from bad state to
the borderline good state s0 = ((1− ǫ)µ, 0) happens with probability ρPr(vt ≥ p∗) = ρ(1−F (p∗)).
Again, in s0 the myopic bidder will bid 0 and immediately transfer back to a bad state. Therefore,
the sequence of states takes the form 6⊥ ⊥⊥⊥⊥⊥ 6⊥ ⊥⊥⊥ 6⊥ ⊥⊥ . . ., i.e., sequence of bad states
interspersed with single good states. The expected length of a subsequence 6⊥ ⊥+ is 1 + 1ρ(1−F (p∗)) ,
with ρ(1−F (p
∗))
1+ρ(1−F (p∗)) ≥ ρρ+1 fraction of bad states. Accounting for the interruption in the last 6⊥ ⊥+
sequence due to end of time horizon T , we have that the expected number of steps in a bad state
is at least
T
ρ(1− F (p∗))
1 + ρ(1− F (p∗)) − 1 ≥ T
ρ
ρ+ 1
− 1.
Substituting, we get:
Rev
M(ǫ,ρ,p∗,R)
0 ≥ p∗(1− F (p∗))
(
ρ
ρ+ 1
− 1
T
)
Lemma B.2 Under mechanism M(ǫ, ρ, p) with ρ ≤ ǫ, at any time t < T , an optimal 1-lookahead
bid exists, and is such that the next state st+1 is deterministically a good state, i.e., st+1 6= ⊥.
Proof: By definition, an optimal 1-lookahead bid bt (if exists) maximizes 1-lookahead expected
utility, i.e.,
bt = argmaxb U
t
1(st, vt, b)
In mechanism M(ǫ, ρ, p), for any t such that st 6= ⊥, the allocation and payment are always
xt = 1, pt = bt. Therefore, using recursive relation between U
t
k and U
t+1
k−1,
U t1(st, vt, bt) = E[(vt − bt) + sup
b′
U t+10 (st+1, vt+1, b
′)|vt, st] (15)
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where st+1 ∼ Q(st, bt, 1, bt). Now, for mechanism M(ǫ, ρ, p), bids get accepted in bad state with at
most ρ probability, therefore,
E[sup
b′
U t+10 (st+1, vt+1, b
′)|st+1 = ⊥] ≤ ρµ,
where as
E[sup
b′
U t+10 (st+1, vt+1, b
′)|st+1 6= ⊥] = µ
which can be achieved by b′ = 0. Also, for M(ǫ, ρ, p), if st is a good state, then depending on the
bid, the next state st+1 will be deterministically bad or good state. For any bid bt such that st+1
is a bad state, substituting above in (15), we have that 1-lookahead utility is at most
vt + ρµ,
where as if st+1 is a good state, then U
t
1(st, vt, bt) ≥ (vt−bt)+µ. This is maximized by the minimum
bid required to keep st+1 as good state. In fact, in any good state st, the bid bt = (1− ǫ)µ, always
ensures st+1 is a good state, and makes the 1-lookahead utility at least
vt + ǫµ
Therefore, if ǫ > ρ, then there exists at least one bid such that st+1 6= ⊥ with strictly better 1-
lookahead utility than any other bid such that st+1 = ⊥. This proves that any 1-lookahead optimal
bid will have the stated property.
Lemma B.3 Under mechanism M(ǫ, ρ, p) with ρ ≤ ǫ2−ǫ , for any k ≥ 1 and time t, such that
st 6= ⊥, an optimal k-lookahead bid exists, and is such that the next state st+1 is deterministically
a good state, i.e., st+1 6= ⊥.
Proof: We prove by induction. In Lemma B.2, this property was proven for 1-lookahead policy.
Assume this is true for 1, . . . , k − 1, then we prove for k.
By definition, a k-lookahead optimal bid (if exists) maximizes the k-lookahead utility. In mech-
anismM(ǫ, ρ, p), if st 6= ⊥, then xt = 1, pt = bt, and depending on the value of bid bt, the next state
st+1 is either bad or a good state deterministically. Suppose for contradiction that the k-lookahead
optimal bid bt is such that st+1 is a bad state. Then, we will show that there exists a bid b
′
t that
achieves strictly better k-lookahead utility.
Consider the bidding strategy that bids k-lookahead optimal bid bt at time t, k − 1-lookahead
optimal bid bt+1 at time t + 1, and so on. Let τ ∈ [1, k] be a random variable defined as the
minimum of k and the number of steps it takes to reach a good state under this strategy, when
starting from the bad state st+1 at time t + 1, i.e., minimum τ such that st+τ+1 6= ⊥ or τ = k.
Now, for i = 1, . . . , τ , let At+i be the event that a Bernoulli(ρ) coin toss is a success. In M(ǫ, ρ, p)
mechanism, in a bad state st+i, nothing gets added to the utility if At+i is false, and at most
vt+i gets added to the utility if At+i is true. Therefore, the contribution to the utility in steps
t, t+ 1 . . . , t+ τ is upper bounded by
vt +
τ∑
i=1
vt+i1(At+i).
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Therefore,
U tk(st, vt, bt) ≤ vt + E[
τ∑
i=1
vt+iI(At+i)
+1(τ < k)E[sup
b
U t+τ+1k−τ−1(st+τ+1, vt+τ+1, b)|st+τ+1]|st, vt] (16)
Next, we compare the above upper bound on utility achieved by bt to the k-lookahead utility
achieved by b′t = (1− ǫ)µ at time t. To lower bound this k-lookahead utility, we consider the utility
of the following bidding strategy starting from b′t = (1− ǫ)µ at time t. Let τ ′ be a random variable
which given st, vt, has the same distribution as the random variable τ defined above. Then,
• in steps t to t+min{τ ′, k − 1}, bid (1− ǫ)µ
• if τ ′ = k, bid 0 at time t+ τ ′
• if τ ′ < k, use k−j−1 lookahead optimal bid starting for time t+j+1 for j = τ ′, τ ′+1, . . . , k−1.
Then, the k-lookahead utility for bid b′t = (1− ǫ)µ can be lower bounded by the utility of the above
strategy
U tk(st, vt, b
′
t) ≥ vt − (1− ǫ)µ+ E[
τ ′∑
i=1
vt+i − (1− ǫ)τ ′ + 1(τ ′ = k)(1− ǫ)µ
+1(τ ′ < k)E[sup
b
U t+τ
′+1
k−τ ′−1(st+τ ′+1, vt+τ ′+1, b)|st+τ ′+1]|st, vt] (17)
Now, we show that the last term from (17) dominates the last term from (16). Since τ and τ ′
have the same distribution, in fact it suffices to compare only the expected sup utility terms for
each i.
Note that by definition of τ , when τ = i, the state st+i+1 reached in (16) is a borderline good
state, i.e., st+i+1 = ((1− ǫ)µ, n) for some n. Also, the bidding strategy used to obtain (17) is such
that it doesn’t leave the good state until at least time t+ τ ′ + 1. Therefore, when τ ′ = i the state
st+i+1 6= ⊥. Now, using Claim 1 (stated and proved below) for k − i− 1, we have for all i, s 6= ⊥,
E[sup
b
U t+i+1k−i−1(st+i+1, vt+i+1, b|st+i+1 = s] ≥ E[sup
b
U t+i+1k−i−1(st+i+1, vt+i+1, b|st+i+1 = ±] (18)
Therefore, we derive that the last term in (17), is greater than or equal to the corresponding term
in (16).
Using this observation, and subtracting (16) from (17), we can bound the total difference
(denoted as ∆) in k lookahead utilities of bt and b
′
t as
∆ := U tk(st, vt, b
′
t)− U tk(st, vt, bt)
≥ E[∑τ ′i=1 vt+i − (τ ′ + 1)(1 − ǫ)µ+ I(τ ′ = k)(1 − ǫ)µ|st, vt]− E[∑τi=1 vt+iI(At+i)|st, vt]
Since τ and τ ′ have the same distribution given st, vt, we can replace τ
′ by τ in above:
∆ ≥ E[∑τi=1 vt+i − (τ + 1)(1 − ǫ)µ+ I(τ = k)(1 − ǫ)µ|st, vt]− E[∑τi=1 vt+iI(At+i)|st, vt]
Combining the first and last term in above, we get
∑τ
i=1 vt+iI(At+i). Now, vt+iI(At+i)− µ(1− ρ),
i = 1, 2, . . . form a martingale, and τ is a finite stopping time (τ ≤ k), therefore, by Wald’s equation,
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E[
∑τ
i=1 vt+iI(At+i)|st, vt] = E[τ |st, vt]E[vt+1I(At+1)|st, vt] = E[τ |st, vt]µ(1− ρ)
In the last expression we used that At+1 and vt+1 are independent, given st, vt. Substituting, we
obtain, (in below we drop the conditional on st, at for notational brevity)
∆ ≥ E[τ ]µ(1− ρ)− (E[τ ] + 1)(1 − ǫ)µ+ Pr(τ = k)(1 − ǫ)µ
= E[τ ](ǫ− ρ)µ− (1− ǫ)µ+ Pr(τ = k)(1 − ǫ)µ
= E[τ ](ǫ− ρ)µ− Pr(τ < k)(1− ǫ)µ
Now, let X be a geometric random variable with success probability ρ, then τ stochastically dom-
inates min{X, k}. And, from Claim 2 (stated and proved below)
E[τ ] ≥ E[min{X, k}] = 1ρ Pr(X < k) + Pr(X ≥ k),
Pr(τ < k) ≤ Pr(X < k) = 1− (1− ρ)k−1
The proof is completed by the following algebraic manipulations:
∆ ≥ E[τ ](ǫ− ρ)µ − Pr(τ < k)(1− ǫ)µ
= 1ρ Pr(X < k)(ǫ− ρ)µ+ Pr(X ≥ k)(ǫ− ρ)µ− Pr(X < k)(1 − ǫ)µ
= (ǫ−ρ)µρ − (1− ǫ)µ + Pr(X ≥ k)(− (ǫ−ρ)µρ + (ǫ− ρ)µ+ (1− ǫ)µ)
= ǫµρ − (2− ǫ)µ + (1− ρ)k−1µ(2− ρ− ǫρ )
We are given that ρ ≤ ǫ(1−ǫ) . Consider two cases: 2− ρ− ǫρ > 0 and 2− ρ− ǫρ ≤ 0. In the first case,
the second term above is positive so that ∆k+1 >
ǫµ
ρ −(2−ǫ)µ ≥ 0, because ρ ≤ ǫ(2−ǫ) . In the second
case, ∆k+1 is minimized for k = 1, i.e., when ∆k+1 = ∆2 =
ǫµ
ρ −(2−ǫ)µ+µ(2−ρ− ǫρ) = (ǫ−ρ)µ > 0.
This proves that U tk(st, vt, b
′
t) − U tk(st, vt, bt) = ∆ > 0 when ρ ≤ ǫ(2−ǫ) , proving a contradiction
that bt is not k-lookahead optimal. Thus, the k-lookahead optimal bid if exists will ensure that
st+1 6= ⊥.
In fact, by induction optimal k − 1-lookahead bid exists, so that the optimal k-lookahead bid
for any t such that st 6= ⊥ is given by:
bt := arg max
b:(b¯n+b)/(n+1)≥(1−ǫ)µ
E[vt − b+max
b′
U t+1k−1(st+1, vt+1, b
′)|st, vt],
which by applying this lemma for k−1, k−2, . . . can be derived to be the minimum bid that would
keep st+1 as a good state.
Claim 1 Under mechanism M(ǫ, ρ, p) with ρ ≤ ǫ2−ǫ , an optimal k-lookahead bid bt at time t, when
starting from any good state st = s 6= ⊥, would achieve at least as much utility as when starting
from a borderline state st = s
′ = ((1 − ǫ)µ, n). That is,
U tk(s, vt, bt) ≥ U tk(s′, vt, bt),∀s 6= ⊥, s′ = ((1− ǫ)µ
Proof: Consider the case when the starting state is a borderline state s′ = ((1 − ǫ)µ, n). Opening
up the recursive definition of k-lookahead utility, we obtain the following expression in terms of
bids bt+1, . . . , bt+k−1 which are optimal k − 1, k − 2, . . . , 1 lookahead bids respectively.
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U tk(s
′, vt, bt) := E[
t+k∑
τ=t
vτx(sτ , bτ )− p(sτ , bτ , xτ )|st = s′, vt]
Using Lemma B.3, the optimal k-lookahead bid for any k ≥ 1 is such that the next state is a good
state, so that if the starting state s′ is a good state, then so are the states sτ , τ = t+1, . . . , t+k in the
above expression. This further implies that if the starting state is a borderline state s′ = (1−ǫ)µ, n,
then the sum of bids bt, bt+1, . . . , bt+k−1 must be at least (1−ǫ)µk. Since in good state, the allocation
is always 1 and the payment is equal to the bid, we obtain the following upper bound on the utility:
U tk(s
′, vt, bt) = E[
t+k∑
τ=t
vτ − bτ |st, vt]
≤ vt + E[
k∑
i=1
vt+i]− k(1− ǫ)µ.
Now, on starting from another good state, say s = (b, n′) 6= ⊥, since b ≥ (1− ǫ)µ, the sum of bids
bt, bt+1, . . . , bt+k−1 needs to be at most (1 − ǫ)µ to remain in a good state, and bt+k = 0 as the
optimal myopic bid (for good state) will be used in this last step. Therefore, for any s 6= ⊥,
U tk(s, vt, bt) ≥ vt + E[
k∑
i=1
vt+i]− k(1 − ǫ)µ ≥ U tk(s′, vt, bt)
Claim 2 Let X be a geometric random variable with success probability ρ, then
E[min{X, k}] = 1
ρ
Pr(X < k) + Pr(X ≥ k)
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Proof:
E[min{X, k}] = E[XI(X < k)] + Pr(X ≥ k)k
=
k−1∑
j=1
(1− ρ)j−1ρj + k(1− ρ)k−1
= E[X] −
∞∑
j=k
(1− ρ)j−1ρj + k(1− ρ)k−1
= E[X] − (1− ρ)k−1
∞∑
j=1
(1− ρ)j−1ρ(j + k − 1) + k(1 − ρ)k−1
= E[X] − (1− ρ)k−1E[X] − (1− ρ)k−1
∞∑
j=1
(1− ρ)j−1ρ(k − 1) + k(1− ρ)k−1
=
1
ρ
(1− (1− ρ)k−1)− (1− ρ)k−1(k − 1) + k(1− ρ)k−1
=
1
ρ
(1− (1− ρ)k−1) + (1− ρ)k−1
=
1
ρ
Pr(X < k) + Pr(X ≥ k)
Proof of Theorem 1.3: We will take our distribution F to be the Pareto distribution with
parameter α > 2, supported on [1,+∞). In particular, the probability density function is f(x) =
α
xα+1
, x ∈ [1,+∞). Note that the mean is µ = αα−1 and the variance is σ2 = α(α−1)2(α−2) , which are
both finite. It is easy to see that RevMye = 1, and that F is a decreasing hazard rate distribution,
as well as a regular distribution.
Now let M = (S, Q, x, p, s1) be a mechanism as defined in Section 2. Consider a myopic
buyer being at state st ∈ S of the mechanism at time t. Given his realized value vt ∼ F and
facing the (randomized) allocation rule x(st, ·) and price rule p(st, ·, ·) of the mechanism in state
st, he would map his value vt to some bid bt to maximize his expected utility Ex∼x(st,bt)[x] · vt −
Ex∼x(st,bt)[p(st, bt, x)].
To prove our result let us suppose that there exists a collection of functions bs : R → ∆R+ ,
indexed by states s ∈ S, which map a realized value for a myopic bidder to a (potentially random-
ized) bid, and which are such that the expected revenue of mechanism M (average over T rounds)
against a myopic buyer using these bidding functions is at least ǫ · RevMye − o(1), where o(1) is a
function that goes to 0 with T . Note that these mappings are only indexed by single states s as
they pertain to the behavior of a myopic buyer. Moreover, note that we actually do not need to
require that for all s, v, bs(v) is optimal. The only assumption that we need to make is that, for
all s, v, v′, the distribution over bids bs(v) does not result in worse utility for a buyer with value v
compared to the distribution bs(v
′). Given this definition, let us also define the effective allocation
probability and effective price functions, xˆ : S × R → [0, 1] and pˆ : S × R → R respectively, as
follows:
∀s, v : xˆ(s, v) = Eb∼bs(v),x∼x(s,b)[x] and pˆ(s, v) = Eb∼bs(v),x∼x(s,b)[p(s, b, x)].
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Via standard argumentation, for all s ∈ S, xˆ(s, ·) and pˆ(s, ·) satisfy the incentive compatibility
constraint that:
∀v, v′ : xˆ(s, v) · v − pˆ(s, v) ≥ xˆ(s, v′) · v − pˆ(s, v′).
Moreover, given that M is non-payment forceful, for all s ∈ S, we get that
pˆ(s, 0) = 0.
Using Myerson’s payment identity, it is standard to argue that any mechanism (xˆ(s, ·), pˆ(s, ·))
satisfying the above constraints can be implemented as a distribution over take-it-or-leave-it offers
of the item at different prices. That is, there exists a distribution Gs over prices such that the
expected revenue and expected buyer utility resulting from (xˆ(s, ·), pˆ(s, ·)) can be written as:
Revsmyop = Ev∼F [pˆ(s, v)] ≡ Ev∼F,p∼Gs [p · 1v≥p] ∗= Ep∼Gs
[
1
pα−1
]
;
Utsmyop = Ev∼F [xˆ(s, v) · v − pˆ(s, v)] ≡ Ev∼F,p∼Gs [(v − p) · 1v≥p] ∗= Ep∼Gs
[
1
α− 1
1
pα−1
]
.
(In the above, the equalities
∗
= follow by plugging in for F the distribution defined above.) So,
in particular, it follows that Utsmyop =
1
α−1Rev
s
myop. To summarize, in any state s ∈ S, a myopic
buyer makes utility that is a factor of α− 1 smaller than the payment that he makes.
Now recall that our mechanism has expected average per round revenue against a myopic buyer
that is at least ǫ ·RevMye − o(1). It follows from the above derivation that it should also then give
expected average per round utility at least 1α−1ǫ · RevMye − o(1) to a myopic buyer. As an infinite
look-ahead buyer (aiming to maximize his utility) can certainly pretend to be myopic, this means
that the mechanism must give expected average per round utility at least 1α−1ǫ · RevMye − o(1) to
an infinite look-ahead buyer. Hence, the expected average per round revenue that the mechanism
can get from an infinite look-ahead buyer is at most:
µ− 1
α− 1ǫ ·Rev
Mye + o(1) = µ− 1
α− 1ǫ · 1 + o(1) (recalling that Rev
Mye = 1)
= µ− α
α− 1
ǫ
α
+ o(1)
=
(
1− ǫ
α
)
µ+ o(1) (recalling that µ =
α
α− 1)
As α can be made arbitrarily close to 2, the theorem holds.
Proof of Theorem 1.4: We will prove the stated bound using equal revenue distribution. k-
lookahead buyers optimize k-lookahead utility, which in round t is given by
U tk(st, vt, bt) = (vtx(st, bt)− p(st, bt)) + max
b′
Es′,v′ [U
t+1
k−1(s
′, b′, v′)|st, bt]
Let us first consider the case when the allocation function is deterministic, i.e., x(s, b) ∈ {0, 1}.
Now, for any state s, let B1s be the set of bids such that x(s, b) = 1. Let V
1
s be the set of
valuations in the support of F such that given any valuation v ∈ V 1s , there is at least one utility
maximizing bid that gets an allocation in state s. More precisely, given a valuation v and state s,
let B∗s,v := {argmaxb U(s, v, b)} denote the set of utility maximizing bids. Then, V 1s is defined the
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set of valuations v for which B1s ∩B∗s,v is non-empty. We observe that the set of utility maximizing
allocating bids is the same for all valuations in V 1s . That is, B
1
s ∩ B∗s,v = B1s ∩ B∗s,v′ =: B∗s , for
any v, v′. This is because, for bids b in B1s , x(s, b) = 1; therefore for any valuation v, the utility
maximizing bids in B1s ∩ B∗s,v are given by set {argmax−p(s, b) + Es′,v′ [maxb′ Uk−1(s′, v′, b′)|s, b},
which does not depend on valuation v.
Now, let vmin = inf{v ∈ V 1s }. Then, for all b ∈ B∗s , by IR property:
0 ≤ U tk(s, b, vmin) = vmin − p(s, b) + E[max
b′
U t+1k−1(s
′, b′, v′)|s, b] ≤ vmin − p(s, b) + kµ
where kµ is an upper bound on the (k−1)-lookahead utility. Thus, rearranging 0 ≤ vmin−p(s, b)+kµ
gives us:
p(s, b) ≤ vmin + kµ.
Further from the per-round ex-post IR property, p(st, bt) ≤ vt. Therefore, expected revenue in
round t, given state st = s is upper bounded by
E[p(st, bt)|st = s] ≤ Ev∈V [min{vmin + kµ, v}I(v ∈ V 1s )] ≤ Ev∈V [min{vmin + kµ, v}I(v ≥ vmin)]
For equal revenue distribution, this is upper bounded by∫ vmin+kµ
vmin
v
1
v2
dv + (vmin + kµ)× 1
vmin + kµ
= log(vmin + kµ)− log(vmin) + 1 ≤ log(kµ) + 1
Randomized allocation. The above argument can be extended to x(s, b) ∈ [0, 1], by replacing
set B1s and V
1
s by B
x
s and V
x
s respectively, defined for every possible value of allocation x ∈ [0, 1].
That is, Bxs is the set of bids such that x(s, b) = x. And, V
x
s is the set of valuations in the support
of F such that given any valuation v ∈ V xs , there is at least one utility maximizing bid that gets
an allocation of x in state s. Then, B∗s,v ∩Bxs denote all the bids which are utility maximizing and
get allocation of x. Using the same argument as above, this set can be shown to be independent of
v, i.e., B∗s,v ∩Bxs = B∗s,x.
Now, for any non-empty V xs , let vmin,x = inf{v ∈ V xs }. Then, for all b ∈ B∗s,x, by IR property:
0 ≤ U tk(s, b, vmin,x) = xvmin,x − p(s, b) + E[max
b′
U t+1k−1(s
′, b′, v′)|s, b] ≤ xvmin,x − p(s, b) + kµ
where U∗k−1 ≤ kµ is an upper bound on the (k − 1)-lookahead utility. so that
p(s, b) ≤ xvmin,x + kµ,
For st, bt, xt = x(st, bt), if bt is an optimal bid, then V
xt
st must be non-empty, and above inequality
can be applied, to get p(st, bt) ≤ xtvmin,xt + kµ. Further from the per-round ex-post IR property,
p(st, bt) ≤ vt. Then, the above argument can be repeated while replacing vmin by vmin,xt , to obtain
the same upper bound.
E[p(st, bt)|st = s] ≤ Ev∈V [min{xtvmin + kµ, v}I(v ∈ V xtst )]
≤ Ev∈V [min{vmin,xt + kµ, v}I(v ≥ vmin,xt)]
For equal revenue distribution, this is bounded by log(vmin,xt +kµ)− log(vmin,xt)+1 ≤ log(kµ)+1.
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